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On Three Types of Empathy: the Perfect, 
the Truncated, and the Contaminated
Introduction
Empathy is a  strongly ambigu-
ous concept which refers to various 
psychological phenomena. These 
phenomena must be carefully dis-
tinguished, and thereby the concept of empathy must be clarified, before 
making an attempt to tackle the following two (arguably crucial) philo-
sophical questions concerning empathy: viz. about the ethical value of 
empathy and the possibility of constructing the ethics of empathy. The 
main goal of this paper is conceptual: it will aim at clarifying the concept 
of empathy by distinguishing its three types, viz. the perfect, the trun-
cated empathy, and the contaminated. The distinction between the three 
types of empathy proposed in this paper draws on or is built upon the 
classical distinction between cognitive and affective empathy1 and on 
the analysis, made both by philosophers and psychologists, of various 
forms of pseudo-empathy. However, this additional distinction may be, as 
I hope to show, useful, especially while tackling the two afore-mentioned 
philosophical problems connected with empathy; I shall argue that the 
conceptual analysis of empathy implies to a large degree the answers to 
these problems. While presenting the three types of empathy, I shall also 
try to develop, by showing its various intricacies, the concept of cognitive 
 1 Cf., e.g., S. Baron-Cohen, The Science of Evil. On Empathy and the Origins of Cruelty, New 
York 2011.
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empathy (which is usually defined simply as the capacity to understand 
what emotion is experienced by the other person).
1. Perfect Empathy
I shall understand perfect empathy as the combination of three ele-
ments, viz.: cognitive empathy, affective empathy, and the tendency to 
take empathic actions. Let me discuss them successively.
(A) Cognitive empathy, in its full-fledged form, is the capacity for 
a comprehensive and ethically proper understanding of other people’s 
emotions. It should be stressed that cognitive empathy may, in particu-
lar cases, be confined to understanding the other persons’ reasons for 
emotions, not the emotions themselves, since the reasons for a given 
emotion may fail to generate the emotion itself. To give an example: 
a person who suffered from the loss of reason “laughs and sings perhaps, 
and is altogether insensible of his misery,”2 but the proper reaction to 
the loss of reason would be sorrow. The above account of cognitive em-
pathy (as confined to the task of a comprehensive and ethically proper 
understanding of the other persons’ emotions) should be distinguished 
from the account according to which cognitive empathy is the ability 
to assume the other persons’ “overall” perspective, combined with the 
willingness (motivated by respect for these persons) to assume such 
a perspective. By an “overall” perspective I mean the other persons’ val-
ues, goals, moral and religious views. This form of cognitive empathy, 
called sometimes “projective empathy,” is an autonomous ethical capac-
ity, which is different from cognitive empathy as targeted at the other 
person’s emotions. Without projective empathy one would not be able 
to respect the other person’s values, goals, moral and religious views, 
if they were different from one’s own. It is therefore strictly connected 
with such virtues as tolerance and leniency. Of course, there may exist 
empirical links between both forms of cognitive empathy: they may 
share to some extent neuronal bases and/or they may strengthen each 
 2 A. Smith, Theory of Moral Sentiments, New York 2007, p. 13.
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other (the possession of one type of cognitive empathy may increase the 
chance of acquiring the other). In the remainder of my paper, however, 
I shall not deal with projective empathy, as it is not directly connected 
to the problem of emotions. I shall now pass to the discussion of the 
two remaining elements of perfect empathy.
(B) An important fact about cognitive empathy is that it becomes ethi-
cally valuable only when it is coupled with affective empathy. Affective 
empathy, in its full-fledged form, is the tendency to emotionally respond 
to other people’s emotions in an ethically proper way, which means that 
it implies cognitive empathy.3 The above – full-fledged – forms of cog-
nitive and affective empathy should be distinguished from their simple 
forms, meaning only, respectively, an understanding of the other person’s 
emotions and responding to these emotions by similar emotions (sor-
row to sorrow, joy to joy).
(C) The empathic action tendency is the tendency to undertake an 
ethically proper action (e.g., helping or consoling) as a result of the emo-
tional response to the other people’s emotions.
The phrase “ethically proper,” which occurs in the above definitions 
of the constituent parts of perfect empathy, implies that perfect empa-
thy is not a free-standing ethical capacity. An understanding of the other 
person’s emotion is only partial, and may be distorted, if it does not in-
clude the knowledge of the causes of the emotion. For instance, the sor-
row of the agent who experiences this emotion because of the loss of the 
beloved person is essentially different from the sorrow of an agent who 
experiences it because of the success of his or her enemy. One can there-
fore speak about the true understanding of the other person’s emotion 
only if one knows its causes and, additionally, is capable of distinguishing 
between the justifying causes (i.e., reasons) and the non-justifying causes 
of a given emotion. As was mentioned earlier, the understanding may 
 3 Cognitive empathy is sometimes called “empathy” tout court, while affective empathy is called 
“sympathy;” the former is “feeling someone’s pain” (or pleasure), the latter “feeling for someone who 
is in pain” (or rejoicing with someone who is joyous); cf. M. Slote, The Ethics of Care and Empathy, 
London–New York 2007, p. 13. 
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be confined only to the reasons for an emotion, if the person, unaware 
of these reasons, does not experience the emotion itself. Affective em-
pathy, in turn, will be ethically proper if it means responding by sorrow 
to other person’s justified sorrow, by joy to the other person’s justified 
joy, and by indifference or sorrow to the other person’s unjustified sor-
row or unjustified joy (the sorrow of the empathic person would not be 
caused in this case by the other person’s emotion as such but by the fact 
that the other person reacts emotionally in a morally inadequate way). 
Clearly, affective empathy may also be an emotional response only to the 
other person’s situation justifying a given emotion, if this person is not 
(fully) aware of this situation and thereby does not feel the appropriate 
emotion. The above, rather abstract account, can be illustrated by an 
example of compassion, i.e., empathy directed at another person’s suf-
fering. I shall assume that perfect empathy is similar to emotions in that 
it has three components, viz: a belief that another person experiences 
a given emotion to a degree d; an evaluation of this emotion (whether 
it is justifiable or not); and a feeling.4 Clearly, belief and evaluation refer 
to cognitive empathy and feeling to affective empathy. Now, a belief may 
be assessed as true or false, an evaluation may be assessed as correct or 
incorrect, and feeling may be assessed as adequate or inadequate and 
proportionate or disproportionate (to an evaluation). It follows from 
the above that cognitive empathy is defective if the belief is false or the 
evaluation is incorrect, and affective empathy is defective if the feeling 
is inadequate to the evaluation (of different “sign” than the evaluation) 
or disproportionate to evaluation (exceedingly intense or not sufficiently 
intense). Now, for compassion to be justified, two conditions must be 
fulfilled: the seriousness of suffering and un-deservedness of suffering 
(i.e., the person did not bring suffering on himself and the suffering is 
 4 These three elements were treated by Robert Nozick (The Examined Life: Philosophical 
Meditations, New York 1990, p. 87–98) as components of emotions, but, arguably, they can be re-
garded also as components of empathy. Indeed, the borderline between empathy and emotions is 
not clear; one may also argue that empathy is a capacity for experiencing second-level emotions, 
i.e., emotions whose objects are emotions of other persons. 
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not a justified punishment for his wrongful action).5 Thus, B’s compas-
sion with A’s suffering is defective if and only if B’s belief “A suffers to 
a degree d” is false, or B’s evaluation “A’s suffering is undeserved” is false, 
or B’s feeling (of sorrow) is inadequate or disproportionate to B’s evalu-
ation. Of course, compassion may be defective also in one more way: if 
it leads to an ethically improper action.
Undoubtedly, perfect empathy is a highly desirable moral capacity, 
since it combines an emotional sensitivity to the other persons’ emo-
tional states with the acute awareness of moral rules. It turns out, how-
ever, that it is not possible to build an ethics of empathy, because, by 
definition, perfect empathy is not a  free-standing, independent moral 
capacity; it implies a sense of justice, or more generally, the knowledge of 
moral rules, which specify in what circumstances an emotion of sorrow 
or joy is justifiable, and what action is ethically appropriate in a given 
situation. Thus, the perspectives for constructing an ethics of empathy 
are very dim.6 Empathy, if it were to mean only an understanding of the 
 5 In my analysis of compassion I draw on Martha Nussbaum’s account of compassion (cf. Upheavals 
of Thought: The Intelligence of Emotions, Cambridge University Press, 2001, p. 304–327), but my fo-
cus is different. Nussbaum provides empirical conditions of compassion (i.e., conditions under which 
compassions is likely to be felt), while my analysis is focused on normative conditions of compassion, 
i.e. conditions specifying when compassion is justified). Nussbaum mentions two other (empirical) 
conditions of compassion: eudaimonistic judgment (that “the person is a significant element in my 
scheme of goals and projects, an end whose good is to be promoted”), and the judgment of similari-
ty (the person must be similar to me if I am to feel compassion towards him or her). It is beyond the 
scope of this paper to analyze whether these two conditions are really necessary for compassion to be 
felt. I shall also not analyze if the two normative conditions (the seriousness of suffering and the non-
-deservedness of suffering) are necessary for compassion (in that case – normatively unjustified) to 
be felt.
 6 An attempt to construct such ethics was made by Michael Slote (The Ethics of Care and Empathy, 
op. cit.), and earlier by Adam Smith (Theory of Moral Sentiments, New York 2007). The ways of con-
structing ethics of empathy, however, are different in both cases. Slote’s version relies on the assump-
tion that an action is morally right iff it is an expression of a fully developed empathic concern for 
the other person, while Smith’s – on the assumption (based on the distinction between the propriety 
of an emotion and the merit of an emotion) that an action is morally proper iff it is motivated by an 
emotion that could be sympathized with by an impartial spectator, and it is morally meritorious iff it 
arouses feelings of gratitude to its beneficiary that could be sympathized with by an impartial specta-
tor. The arguments against ethics of empathy invoked in this paper apply to both versions.
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other person’s emotions, responding to these emotions by similar emo-
tions (sorrow to sorrow, joy to joy) and undertaking an empathic action, 
would in many cases result in well-intentioned but morally improper ac-
tions. Furthermore, assume that at some time t we feel empathy towards 
two suffering persons, but we can help only one of them. The question 
as to which of these persons should receive our help cannot be decided 
by empathy alone, unless we assume a criterion that the ‘strength’ of 
our empathy should decide. But this criterion is indefensible, since the 
strength of our empathy is very often dependent on morally irrelevant 
considerations (race, sex, religion, etc.). Therefore ethics of empathy 
cannot be free-standing; it requires additionally a set of rules prescrib-
ing when, in what circumstance, towards whom empathy is demanded, 
what actions should be taken as a  result of the empathic response to 
the other persons’ feelings, and how to decide conflicts of empathic im-
pulses.7 Two additional remarks may be proper here. Firstly, it follows 
from the above analysis that the ethics of perfect empathy might argu-
ably be a plausible ethics, but it would not be a pure ethics of empathy, 
because the very concept of perfect empathy, as defined in this paper, is 
a normative one, i.e., it implies a set of moral rules. Secondly, it is clear 
that perfect empathy is not necessary for moral action: one can easily 
imagine a non-empathic agent strictly following moral rules and thereby 
undertaking moral actions. But it must be admitted that perfect empa-
thy provides an especially strong motivation to undertake moral actions. 
Furthermore, if one were to provide an agent-based, not an action-based 
moral evaluation of agents undertaking moral actions, then the evalu-
ation of a perfectly empathic agent would undoubtedly be higher than 
that of a non-empathic follower of moral rules.
 7 That ethics of empathy cannot be built was the thesis held also by Max Scheler; Scheler (Istota 
i formy sympatii, transl. A. Węgrzecki, Warszawa 1980, p. 234–253) stressed that for empathy (or 
sympathy – the term he used) to have ethical value, it must be empathy with emotions deserving 
empathy, and in order to distinguish the emotions deserving empathy from those undeserving it 
we must have a prior (independent of empathy itself) conception of justice, blame, responsibility. 
From the psychological perspective, the limits of ethics of empathy have been insightfully descri-
bed by Martin Hoffman (Empatia i rozwój moralny, transl. O. Waśkiewicz, Gdańsk 2006, Ch. 8).
7 On Three Types of Empathy …
2. Truncated Empathy
Truncated empathy lacks one of the free elements of perfect empathy, 
or contains one or more of them but only in an truncated form. Truncated 
empathy may therefore take various forms, ranging from those which 
are morally reprehensible, to those which are morally commendable. The 
morally reprehensible form of truncated empathy is the combination of 
cognitive empathy with the absence of affective empathy, i.e., the combi-
nation of the capacity to recognize the other person’s emotions with the 
incapacity to react to them. This kind of combination is characteristic 
for psychopaths, though, arguably, is not sufficient for creating a psy-
chopathic personality. As Simon Baron-Cohen8 notes, the psychopath, 
apart from displaying this combination, must be, additionally, “morally 
negative,” which implies that the combination of cognitive empathy with 
the absence of affective empathy is, by itself, not sufficient for generat-
ing a psychopathic personality; for this personality to arise, some kind 
of profound indifference to moral rules or to other persons’ well-being 
is needed. This indifference to other persons can be described in Martin 
Buber’s terms as the tendency to treat other persons as things – to re-
place the personal relation based on “Du” with the impersonal relation 
based on “Es”9 (of course, this is still not an explanation of this tendency 
but pointing at its different aspect). The morally commendable form of 
truncated empathy consists of cognitive empathy and affective empathy 
in their simple form (i.e., not supported by moral rules). Clearly, this 
combination is desirable: a person who displays these two forms of em-
pathy exhibits sensitivity to the other person’s feelings, and this sensi-
tivity is valuable in itself. But, as mentioned above, this kind of sensitiv-
ity, if unsupported by the knowledge of moral rules and the motivation 
to analyze the causes of the other person’s emotions, is likely to lead to 
morally improper actions if the other person’s emotions are unjustified 
(if, e.g., the person empathized with feels sorrow for immoral reasons).
 8 S. Baron-Cohen, The Science of Evil…, op. cit., p. 154.
 9 Cf. M. Buber, Je et tu, transl. G. Bianquis, Paris 2012.
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3. Contaminated Empathy
Contaminated empathy arises by admixing one of the following four 
amoral or non-moral elements to perfect empathy, viz.
(a) the feeling of relief, i.e., thankfulness at the contrast between our 
fortune and the sufferer’s misfortune;
(b) the feeling of anxiety about our own good future arising at the 
sight of the sufferer’s misfortune;
(c) the feeling of superiority over the other person (i.e. pity);
(d) and the personal distress: the unpleasant feeling, arising at the sight 
of the sufferer’s sorrow, caused by the very picture of suffering rather than 
by anxiety about one’s own good fortune.
It is to be emphasized that all the four motives contaminating perfect 
empathy are self-regarding – they have as their ultimate end the well-
being of the agent, not the interests of the other person. They can also 
function as free-standing motives, in which case they can be regarded 
as various forms of, what may be called, pseudo-empathy.10 The first 
two of these motives were analyzed by Samuel Butler in Fifteen Sermons 
Preached at the Rolls Chapel, in his famous polemics with Hobbes’s defi-
nition of pity as “fear felt for oneself at the sight of another’s distress.” 
The polemics was nicely summarized by Charlie Dunbar Broad in the 
following passage:
He [Butler] points out (a) that, on this definition, a  sympathetic man is ipso 
facto a man who is nervous about his own safety, and the more sympathetic he is the 
more cowardly he will be. This is obviously contrary to fact. (b) We admire people 
for being sympathetic to distress; we have not the least tendency to admire them for 
being nervously anxious about their own safety. If Hobbes were right admiration 
for sympathy would involve admiration for timidity. (c) Hobbes mentions the fact 
 10 One could, following Scheler (Istota i formy sympatii, op. cit.), distinguish one more form of 
pseudo-empathy – Ansteckung (emotional contagion), but this form would essentially differ from 
the previous ones, as emotional contagion does not seem self-regarding (though it is not other-re-
garding either). 
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that we tend specially to sympathise with the troubles of our friends, and he tries to 
account for it. But, on Hobbes’s definition, this would mean that we feel particularly 
nervous for ourselves when we see a friend in distress. Now, in the first place, it may 
be doubted whether we do feel any more nervous for ourselves when we see a friend 
in distress than when we see a stranger in the same situation. On the other hand, 
it is quite certain that we do feel more sympathy for the distress of a  friend than 
for that of a stranger. Hence it is impossible that sympathy can be what Hobbes says 
that it is. Butler himself holds that when we see a man in distress our state of mind 
may be a mixture of three states. One is genuine sympathy, i.e., a direct impulse to 
relieve his pain. Another is thankfulness at the contrast between our good fortune 
and his ill luck. A third is the feeling of anxiety about our own future described by 
Hobbes. These three may be present in varying proportions, and some of them may 
be wholly absent in a particular case. But it is only the first that any plain man means 
by “sympathy” or “pity.”11
At the end of this passage Broad treats “sympathy” (or compassion) 
and “pity” as identical. But there are good reasons to treat them as dist-
inct. The distinction was neatly made by Philip Mercer12 and recalled 
by David E. Cartwright13. Compassion, corresponding to what I have 
called “perfect empathy,” is an altruistic – other-regarding – virtue having 
as its ultimate aim the well-being of the other person. Pity, by contrast, 
is egoistic – self-regarding: it is expressive of contempt towards the other 
person and aims at heightening one’s self-esteem and the feeling of one’s 
power. It embraces cognitive empathy but it lacks affective empathy: there 
is no feeling of sorrow at the other person’s suffering or, at best, the fee-
ling of sorrow is mixed with the joy at the possibility of increasing one’s 
self-esteem and the feeling of one’s power. Cartwright characterizes it in 
the following way:
 11 C. B. Broad, Five Types of Ethical Theory, London 1930, p. 53, http://www.ditext.com/broad/
ftet/ftet.html (20.06.2017).
 12 P. Mercer, Sympathy and Ethics, Oxford 1972, p. 18.
 13 D. E. Cartwright, Schopenhauer’s Compassion and Nietzsche’s Pity, “Schopenhauer Jahrbuch” 
69 (1988), p. 557–567.
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the pitier is superior in status to the pitied. We do not pity those we respect or 
those we judge superior to ourselves – unless we wish to level them by devaluing 
their status […] By pitying them, I elevate myself. I boost my feelings of self-esteem 
by exercising my pity I boost my feelings of self-esteem by exercising my pity. The 
same is true when I pity someone who is suffering. […] The sufferer is helped, but 
helped in order to enhance my feelings of superiority. In these regards, pity is self-
-regarding. If we have general duties to respect other, pity incites their violations. If 
the moral goodness of beneficence is due to a desire to pursue another’s well-being, 
the help rendered out of pity is not morally good.14
Pity is not morally good because it does not lead to “acts of benefi-
cence for the right sorts of reasons.”15
All of the four forms of pseudo-empathy were recognized and de-
scribed with great clarity by Nietzsche. To give some examples: he wrote 
in Daybreak that we may be attracted to sufferers
to present ourselves as the more powerful and as a helper, if we are certain of 
applause, if we want to feel how fortunate we are in contrast, or hope that the sight 
will relieve our boredom […] and if we encounter sufferers, we might render aid be-
cause the other’s suffering […] offends us; it would make us aware of our impotence, 
and perhaps, of our cowardice, if we did not go to assist him. Or it brings with it 
a diminution of our honour in the eyes of the others or in our own eyes.16
In the same book he insightfully described the inner mechanism of 
pity: “To offer pity (Mitleid) is as good as offering contempt;”17 and: “There 
is something degrading in suffering and something elevating and produc-
tive of superiority in pitying (im Mitleiden).”18 Similar remarks were made 
in the “Von den Mitleidigen” section from the second book of Thus Spoke 
Zarathustra. In The Gay Science, in turn, he wrote as follows:
 14 D. E. Cartwright, Schopenhauer’s Compassion and Nietzsche’s Pity, op. cit., p. 559.
 15 D. E. Cartwright, Schopenhauer’s Compassion and Nietzsche’s Pity, op. cit., p. 560.
 16 F. Nietzsche, Daybreak, transl. R. J. Hollingdale, Cambridge 1982, paragraph 133.
 17 F. Nietzsche, Daybreak, op. cit., paragraph 135.
 18 F. Nietzsche, Daybreak, op. cit., paragraph 138.
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When we see somebody suffer, we like to exploit this opportunity to take pos-
session of him; those who become his benefactors and pity him, for example, do 
this and call the lust for a new possession that he awakens in them “love;” and the 
pleasure they feel is comparable to that aroused by the prospect of a new conquest;19 
and also: 
Pity (Mitleid) is the most agreeable feeling among those who have little pride 
and no prospect of great conquests; for them easy prey – and that is what all who 
suffer are – is enchanting. Pity (Mitleid) is praised as the virtue of prostitutes.20
Cartwright comments on this last – famous – fragment in the follow-
ing manner:
Someone who is suffering stands in great need of help and is more than willing 
to accept our aid. Thus it is easy to benefit them. It is far more difficult to benefit so-
meone who is faring well, since they are less disposed to accept our help. Its accom-
plishment, however, is a greater expression of power and, as such, is something to 
take pride in accomplishing.21
In his paper devoted to the Nietzschean critique of Mitleid Cartwright 
argues that Nietzsche failed to notice two sense of Mitleid, which can be 
rendered into English as “compassion” and “pity.” According to Cart-
wright, Nietzsche was right in so far as his critique of Mitleid was a critique 
of pity, but he was wrong in two points: in failing to notice that there is 
a different, ethically commendable type of Mitleid, viz. compassion; and in 
assuming that Schopenhauer and Christianity understood Mitleid as pity. 
This opinion of Cartwright ought to be corrected only in one point: it is 
true that Nietzsche denied the existence of altruistic compassion, but he 
did not simply identify Mitleid with pity; he distinguished several different 
 19 F. Nietzsche, The Gay Science, transl. W. Kaufmann, New York 1974, paragraph 14.
 20 F. Nietzsche, The Gay Science, op. cit., paragraph 13.
 21 D. E. Cartwright, Schopenhauer’s Compassion and Nietzsche’s Pity, op. cit., p. 561.
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forms of pseudo-empathy, pity being only one of them. Nietzsche’s mis-
take was therefore to deny the existence of perfect – altruistic – empathy. 
I shall return to this last point in the “concluding remarks.”
4. Concluding Remarks
Let me summarize the main conceptual distinctions introduced in 
the paper:
1. Perfect empathy consists of ethically grounded cognitive empathy, 
ethically grounded affective empathy, and the tendency to undertake 
morally adequate actions as a result of affective empathy.
2. Truncated empathy appears if there is lacking one of the elements 
of perfect empathy, or if at least one of its elements is not supported by 
the clear knowledge of moral rules (i.e., is not ethically grounded, or 
a tendency to undertake actions is not guided by the clear knowledge 
of moral rules).
3. Contaminated empathy is perfect empathy combined with one of 
the four self-regarding motives: the feeling of relief that the other, not 
myself, is the victim of suffering; the anxiety about one’s own future; the 
feeling of superiority (pity), or personal distress.
4. Pseudo-empathy appears if any of the four “contaminating” motives 
appears as a free-standing motive.
As mentioned above, it was a view of a number of philosophers, in-
cluding Hobbes and Nietzsche, that perfect empathy does not exist; that 
in each empathic action one can always seek out some egoistic motive. 
But this view does not seem convincing; the common experience, the 
famous experiments on the empathy-altruism hypothesis made by C. D. 
Batson,22 and the strong philosophical arguments raised by Butler support 
 22 Batson’s method of testing the hypothesis that empathy may be “other-oriented,” i.e., con-
nected with the altruistic motivation, consisted in setting up such experiments which could elimi-
nate the competing hypotheses. For instance, if an agent sees a person in pain and has the option 
of going away and thereby removing the suffering person from her view, and nonetheless helps this 
person, then it can hardly be assumed that she was motivated by personal distress (since, if she was, 
then the least costly method of removing the distress would be to go away). The fact that she did not 
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the view that perfect empathy does exist. Furthermore, as Cartwright 
aptly remarks (in the spirit of Butler’s critique of psychological egoism 
defended by Hobbes),
simply showing that an agent may derive pleasure, relieve feelings of sorrow or 
grief, feel self-satisfied, or better about oneself for helping another, is not to show 
that the action is self-regarding. In the same regard, simply arguing that in one sense 
all interests are mine, in the sense that I possess them, does not show that this is 
a self-regarding interest. What he had to show was that the end of the action was the 
agent’s pleasure, feelings of self-esteem or superiority.23 
Thus, Nietzsche could have not proved that the agent can never have 
the other person’s well-being as its end. What he was able to prove was 
that in many cases of purported altruistic empathy a different – egoistic – 
motivation may in fact be operating. But one must concede that there is 
some reason in Nietzsche’s claim: it seems that perfect empathy rarely or 
never appears in an uncontaminated form. But, let me repeat, Nietzsche 
believed that perfect empathy never exists, even in a contaminated form; 
he believed that all forms of empathy are at bottom egoistic, i.e., are forms 
of pseudo-empathy. This is an extreme and implausible view.
Finally, let me recall the two ethical conclusions that flow from 
my considerations. The first one concerns the value of empathy as 
a  moral motive. Empathy is a  valuable moral motive if it takes the 
form of perfect empathy, which combines an emotional sensitivity to 
the other persons’ emotional states with the acute awareness of moral 
rules. Furthermore, this motive is particularly precious: arguably, most 
of us would prefer to be helped by a person motivated by this kind of 
go away does not yet prove that she was motivated by the “other-oriented” (i.e. altruistic – perfect) 
empathy because one can conjure up other explanations of her altruistic action, but this fact incre-
ases the probability of the empathy-altruism hypothesis. This probability further increases when, 
by means of analogous experiments (which Batson conducted), other hypotheses competing with 
the empathy-altruism hypothesis are eliminated. Cf. C. D. Batson, The Altruism Question: Toward 
A Social-Psychological Answer, New York 1991.
 23 D. E. Cartwright, Schopenhauer’s Compassion and Nietzsche’s Pity, op. cit., p. 564.
14 Wojciech Załuski
motive than by any other kind of motive (and especially, by the Kan-
tian motive of acting for the sake of duty). However, the other types of 
empathy (truncated and contaminated) as well as pseudo-empathy are 
either morally dubious (as they are not based on a clear awareness of 
moral rules) or simply morally wrong (if the element of selfishness is 
prominent, as it is, for instance, in the case of personal distress). The 
second conclusion concerns the possibility of constructing the ethics 
of empathy. As already mentioned, the ethics of empathy cannot be 
built without recourse to moral rules, specifying when empathy is to 
be felt, what actions it should lead to, and how to decide conflicts of 
empathic impulses; thus, the ethics of empathy cannot be free-standing, 
which amounts to saying that there cannot exist this kind of ethics as 
ethics sui generis.
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Abstract
On Three Types of Empathy: the Perfect, the Truncated,  
and the Contaminated
In the paper a distinction is made between perfect empathy, truncated empathy, and 
contaminated empathy. Perfect empathy is defined as the combination of three elements: 
cognitive empathy (the capacity for a comprehensive and ethically proper understand-
ing of other people’s emotions), affective empathy (the tendency to emotionally respond 
to other people’s emotions in an adequate way: sorrow to sorrow, and joy to joy), and 
a tendency to undertake an ethically proper action (e.g., to relieve the sufferer’s pain) 
as a result of the emotional response to other people’s emotions. The phrase ‘ethically 
proper’ in the above definitions shows that perfect empathy is not a free-standing ethi-
cal capacity. An empathic emotional reaction and empathic action are justified only if 
they are based on the comprehensive and the ethically proper understanding of the other 
person’s emotion, i.e., the understanding which enables one to assess whether this emo-
tion is justified by its causes. But such an understanding is impossible without a sense 
of justice, or more generally, without the knowledge of ethical rules which say in what 
circumstances an emotion of sorrow or joy is justifiable, and, additionally, what action is 
ethically proper in a given situation. Truncated empathy, which may take various forms, 
lacks one of the free elements of perfect empathy. Finally, contaminated empathy arises 
by admixing one of the four following amoral or non-moral elements to perfect or trun-
cated empathy, namely: thankfulness at the contrast between our fortune and the suf-
ferer’s misfortune; the feeling of anxiety, arising at the sight of the sufferer’s misfortune, 
about our own good future; the unpleasant feeling of distress, arising at the sight of the 
sufferer’s sorrow; or pity.
Keywords 
affective empathy, cognitive empathy, empathic action, pseudo-empathy
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Abstrakt
O trzech rodzajach empatii: pełnej, częściowej i skażonej
Celem artykułu jest wyróżnienie trzech rodzajów empatii: pełnej, częściowej i „ska-
żonej” oraz zbadanie relacji między nimi. Empatia pełna obejmuje trzy składowe: empa-
tię kognitywną (zdolność wszechstronnego i etycznie właściwego rozumienia cudzych 
emocji), afektywną (skłonność do adekwatnego reagowania na cudze emocje, tj. smut-
kiem na smutek i radością na radość) oraz skłonność do podejmowania etycznie właści-
wych – empatycznych – działań (np. zmierzających do uśmierzenia bólu osoby cierpią-
cej). Wyrażenie „etycznie właściwe” pojawiające się w powyższych definicjach pokazuje, 
że empatia pełna nie jest samoistną zdolnością etyczną. Empatia afektywna i empatyczne 
działanie są uzasadnione etycznie tylko wtedy, kiedy są oparte na empatii kognitywnej, 
w której definicję wpisana jest znajomość reguł etycznych, pozwalających stwierdzić 
(m.in.), kiedy smutek i radość drugiej osoby zasługują na reakcję empatyczną. Empatia 
częściowa występuje wtedy, kiedy brakuje jednego z trzech powyższych elementów skła-
dowych (może więc przybrać wiele różnych postaci). Wreszcie, z empatią skażoną mamy 
do czynienia wtedy, kiedy do empatii pełnej lub częściowej dochodzi jeden z następu-
jących amoralnych lub pozamoralnych elementów: niepokój o  własny dobrostan, dy-
skomfort pojawiający się wskutek obserwacji cierpienia drugiej osoby, poczucie ulgi czy 
zadowolenia z powodu kontrastu między sytuacją osoby cierpiącej i sytuacją własną.
Słowa kluczowe
empatia afektywna, empatia kognitywna, działanie empatyczne, pseudoempatia
